In his post “The EU-Turkey Deal after Nine Years: Between Controversy and Shifting Paradigms”, Alberto Nicelli delves into the impacts of the EU-Turkey Deal, which has governed migration management and shaped relations between Turkey and the EU for nearly a decade. The post reflects on the Deal’s achievements and shortcomings, examining its future amidst evolving geopolitical contexts.
The EU-Turkey Deal after Nine Years:
Between Controversy and Shifting Paradigms
Alberto Nicelli*
This March the EU-Turkey Deal is approaching its 9th anniversary. Considering the deep impact the Deal had on migration management and EU-Turkey relations, it is both crucial and relevant to reflect on what it accomplished so far, what it didn’t and which prospective it has.
Signed in 2016 while the Balkan area was facing an unprecedented refugee crisis, the deal has shaped a new European migration policy that lasted almost a decade, setting a precedent for the externalization of border control.
Background and origins
The EU-Turkey Deal roots back to the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 under the wave of the “Arab Spring”. As violence quickly escalated, millions of Syrians decided – or were forced – to flee their homes, seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. In a few years refugees’ numbers rose from less than 100.000 to more the 1 million and, by 2019, Turkey alone had become home to 3.6 million[1] of Syrian refugees, hence representing the largest refugee-hosting country in the world. However, this unprecedented influx caused incredible pressure on Turkey’s economic, political and social systems.
Simultaneously, Europe faced a flood of over 1 million asylum seekers and migrants arriving on its shores in 2015 alone. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS), designed between 1999 and 2005, struggled to handle this influx, leading to political disputes among Member States, chaotic scenes at borders and a humanitarian crisis that demanded urgent action.
Key principles and mechanisms
In response to this crisis, the EU sought a partnership with Turkey to manage migration flows more effectively, especially the infamous “Aegean route”, which caused several deaths. The resulting deal was signed by Turkish and European representatives on the 18th of March 2016 and, most important, was based on four pillars:
- Prevention of sea crossings: Turkey agreed to taking measures to prevent irregular migration across the Aegean Sea. In this regard, Turkey had been appointed as “safe third country” for refugees.
- 1:1 mechanism: for every Syrian asylum seeker returned to Turkey from Greece, another would be resettled in the EU through legal channels.
- Financial support: the EU committed an initial €6 billion aid to support Syrian refugees in Turkey[2], which would have been deployed throughout the FRIT (Facility for Refugees in Turkey).
- Accession talks: the deal aimed to speed up Turkey’s EU accession negotiations and promised visa liberalization for Turkish citizens.
Initial successes and flaws
At the beginning, the deal appeared successful in preventing irregular migration: the number of arrivals dropped dramatically from over 850,000 in 2015 to roughly 29,000 in 2017[3]. This reduction was greeted by the European Institutions as a significant achievement[4]. However, while the deal succeeded in reducing immediate migration flows, it also faced numerous criticisms from various actors.
Organizations such as Amnesty International[5], for instance, highlighted reports of human rights abuses against migrants and refugees returned to Turkey. In addition, the concept of Turkey as a “safe third country” was contested due to ongoing concerns about conditions for refugees within its borders, with examples of people even deported back to Syria.
Others highlighted the legal challenges the agreement was posing. In particular, there were debates concerning whether the Deal was an effective treaty or not[6]. This raised questions regarding the deal’s compliance with international law and its implications for asylum seekers’ rights.
Evolving Turkish-EU relations
It is undeniable that the EU-Turkey Deal significantly impacted relations between Brussels and Ankara. Although it was initially viewed as a pragmatic and necessary solution for both the partners, the agreement soon became a contentious issue. On the one hand, the Deal has been used as a sort of “bargaining chip”: Turkey pushed the agreement as leverage in negotiations with the EU, occasionally threatening to “open the gates” for refugees if its demands were not met. On the other hand, unfinished commitments regarding visa liberalization and customs union upgrades led to inevitable tensions between Turkey and various EU member states.
However, the FRIT contributed positively to the operational and technical aspects of EU-Turkey cooperation, with limited good impact on their relations. By delivering humanitarian and development assistance to the refugee community through the active involvement of various international organizations and NGOs – particularly from Turkey’s perspective – the FRIT facilitated the standardization of migration management and governance in Turkey. Additionally, it had favourable effects on human resources and job opportunities within the migration sector.
A Precedent for externalization
One of most evident effects of the EU-Turkey Deal is that it marked a turning point in European migration policy by establishing a framework for externalizing border control responsibilities. The deal may serve as a model for future agreements, as it established a precedent for similar arrangements with other countries aiming to manage migration flows into Europe. Some countries already began to move towards this direction, like Italy who signed a memorandum with Tunisia under the European Commission approval[7].
Nevertheless, it illustrated the EU’s willingness to prioritize border control over humanitarian obligations, raising ethical questions about its approach to migration management. This is due to domestic political reasons in different Member States, where bigger parts of civil society have been perceiving migration as an uncontrolled phenomenon[8].
Recent developments: Syrian refugees return and far-right resurgence
As we progress in 2025, various factors are contributing to the transformation of the general landscape behind the Deal.
The first is the Syrian refugee return to the homeland. Since Assad’s regime downfall in December 2024, a new trend of refugees returning to Syria is emerging, potentially altering the dynamics of the deal and related measures. According to sources from the Turkish Government, more than 100.000 people have re-entered Syria, so far, but they could be even more[9]. If this return will be permanent is yet to be seen, but this shift could reduce the number of refugees in Turkey, impacting future negotiations.
The second one is the far-right resurgence: successful electoral results of many far-right parties across Europe are influencing migration policies. In Germany, AfD gained the 22% of the vote in the last parliamentary election, while during the last legislature CDU opposition leader Friedrich Merz – with the support from AfD as well – has proposed a controversial five-point migration plan[10]; at the same time, countries like Italy are trying to follow a harsh stance on immigration. In this context, the EU-Turkey Deal could be viewed as a potential blueprint for the far-right’s remigration idea, aimed at reducing immigrant populations in European countries.
Thirdly, despite mutual criticism and political differences, both the EU and Turkey recognize the need for ongoing collaboration, as officially the Turkey’s accession process to the EU is still open, the FRIT will continue its operativity for years – there are projects which need to be concluded and others that have been renewed[11] – and the general international uncertainty is leaving room for cooperation in other areas.
For all these reasons, the future of the deal will likely involve renegotiations to address changing political and geopolitical realities as well as migration patterns.
What’s next? Challenges and opportunities
It is clear that the future of migration management in Europe and Turkey will be marked by a mix of complex challenges and significant opportunities. The growing number of Syrian refugees returning to their homeland could reduce pressure on Turkish infrastructure, but it also raises questions about the long-term sustainability of such returns. To sum up, the most compelling themes could include:
- Integration and development: following some good practices from the FRIT, the EU could focus on better integrating refugees who remain in Europe, improving policies for social and economic inclusion. This, if correctly implemented, could positively affect the general perception of migrants and refugees across the Continent.
- Reform of CEAS: the migration crisis has clearly highlighted the weaknesses of the European asylum system. A reform of CEAS[12] is necessary, and it could include more efficient mechanisms for distributing refugees among member states, thereby reducing pressure on countries of first arrival.
- International cooperation: migration management requires global cooperation. The EU could strengthen its partnerships with third countries to improve refugee protection and address the root causes of forced migration, possibly by implementing effective development programs and by demanding the respect of human rights laws. The ongoing operational cooperation between Turkey and EU under the FRIT is surely a positive element which can generate further good practices that can be applied to other contexts.
Conclusions
The EU-Turkey Deal has definitely shaped European migration policy while revealing Europe’s struggle between humanitarian values and security concerns. This is the lesson learned after nine years. The recent fall of Assad has (re)opened the doors for thousands of Syrian refugees to return to their homes, potentially influencing the Deal’s dynamics. Meanwhile, Europe’s political environment has shifted: far-right parties are gaining consensus across the continent, and they might view the Deal as a blueprint for stricter migration policies.
Despite the frustration caused by unfulfilled promises on visa liberalization and accession talks to the EU, both sides seem interested in keeping a relationship of convenience; and undoubtedly, the FRIT program has delivered some positive results, showing that technical cooperation can be possible even when political relations are conflictual.
Given that the Deal’s approach to externalize border control is already inspiring similar arrangements across the Mediterranean region, the Europe’s future migration management will increasingly be about finding a balance between humanitarian duties and the growing domestic pressure for stricter controls. In the end, the EU-Turkey Deal highlights Europe’s continuous challenge to match different values and needs in a complex global context.
Essential Bibliography
- European Commission. (2023). EU and Tunisia adopt a memorandum of understanding on a strategic and comprehensive partnership (Press Release No. IP/23/3887). Publications Office of the European Union. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3887.
- European Commission. (2017). Sixth report on the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement. Publications Office of the European Union. Retrieved from: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/b009736f-ad03-4e3b-81b4-96fb5961e6d6_en?filename=170613_6th_report_on_the_progress_made_in_the_implementation_of_the_eu-turkey_statement_en.pdf.
- European Court of Auditors. (2024). The Facility for Refugees in Turkey: Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured (Special Report No. 06/2024). Publications Office of the European Union. Retrieved from: https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications?ref=SR-2024-06.
- Pries, L., & Savci, B. S. Z. (2023). Between Humanitarian Assistance and Externalizing of EU Borders: The EU-Turkey Deal and Refugee Related Organizations in Turkey. Journal on Migration and Human Security, 11(1), 57-74. https://doi.org/10.1177/23315024231156381.
- Schlieter, E. (2025). The Instrumentalization of the Syrian Refugee Crisis and Conflictual Cooperation between the EU and Turkey (Doctoral dissertation). University of Bamberg. Retrieved from: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/server/api/core/bitstreams/2ffeab8a-6143-4a01-997f-eb6a89529311/content.
- World Bank. (2020, November 20). Turkey: Agricultural employment support for refugees and Turkish citizens through enhanced market linkages project (Report No. PAD3504). The World Bank. Retrieved from: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P171543.
[1] Source: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113.
[2] The European Union added three further billions through other channels; see more at: The Facility for Refugees in Turkey Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured. ECA. (2024).
[3] Source: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/europe-sea-arrivals/location/24489.
[4] It is clearly stated in the Sixth Report on the Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, published by the EU Commission in 2017.
[5] For instance, see: https://www.amnesty.nl/actueel/eu-turkey-deal-greek-decision-highlights-fundamental-flaws.
[6] A good example of the debate can be found here: https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/04/is-eu-turkey-refugee-and-migration-deal.html.
[7] For further detail see the Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic and global partnership between the European Union and Tunisia, signed on 16th July 2023 in Tunis.
[8] Source: https://www.migrationdataportal.org/themes/public-opinion-migration
[9] The number comes from a Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement on 5th March 2024, however it slightly differs from official IOM’s data; see more at: https://dtm.iom.int/reports/syrian-arab-republic-community-baseline-assessment-round-1-01-28-february-2025?close=true
[10] See more here: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/31/german-parliament-rejects-immigration-bill-backed-far-right-afd
[11] One example is the World Bank’s project addressing the “Agricultural employment support for refugees and Turkish citizens through enhanced market linkages”; further informations can be found here: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P171543.
[12] A reform is already discussed since 2020; see more here: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system_en.
*Alberto Nicelli is an Italian master’s student in International Relations and Economic Development at the University of Pavia, with a strong interest in the intersection of migration, development, and international cooperation. His thesis focuses on the impact of development projects funded by the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT), particularly in the area of socio-economic support for refugees. Having spent a year in Turkey collaborating with an important public university in Istanbul, Alberto’s experiences have deepened his understanding of Middle Eastern and Balkan dynamics, as well as Turkish-European relations. His future career aspirations lie in political-economic research, driven by a strong curiosity for regional development and global challenges.
** The ideas and opinions expressed in GAR Blog publications are those of the authors; they do not reflect those of the Association for Migration Research.
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