This article is part of the blog series “Who, What, and How Much Does Temporary Protection Protect?” and edited by Ibrahim Soysüren. It builds on presentations from a workshop which had the same title and held on 9 December 2023 in Izmir and jointly organised by the NCCR On the Move, the Institute of Sociology of the University of Neuchâtel, and the Izmir Bar Association.
In this article, Omar Kadkoy shows that while the fall of the Syrian regime on 8 December 2024 has significantly changed the political landscape, conditions in Syria are insufficient and unsafe for large-scale returns. From this perspective, Turkey’s “go-and-see” visit policy allows Syrians under temporary protection to assess the situation first-hand before deciding whether to return.
“Go and See” to Return: Turkish Policy and Syrian Reality
Omar Kadkoy*
Syrians around the world woke up to a new reality on 8 December 2024: The Assads’ reign of iron fist over Syria since 1970 collapsed, dragging with it the Ba’ath Party’s monopoly of the political scene since 1963. The unexpected and the speed with which the Syrian regime collapsed triggered many questions about Syria’s political and socio-economic outlook and the future of Syrians outside the country. Concerning the latter, European politicians in several hosting countries interpreted the fall of the Syrian regime as the immediate disappearance of the threat for Syrians to seek asylum and refuge. Indeed, at least 10 European countries suspended processing asylum applications of Syrian nationals. In Turkey, the opposition capitalized on Assad’s fall by saying there is no more valid reason for Syrians to stay in Turkey. The government, on the other hand, pursued a wiser policy decision by allowing Syrians under temporary protection to make “go and see” visits to assess the situation in Syria before returning. The conditions in Syria, however, remain unripe for return despite the fall of the Syrian regime. Thus, Turkey should maintain legal protection in effect, extend the period of the “go-and-see” visits, and abide by the principle of non-refoulement until the prevalence of state and human security in Syria.
The list of questions over Syria’s new future is long, and one of them concerns the return possibility of 4.3 million Syrians who sought asylum and refuge in the last 14 years. The political landscape in Syria has undoubtedly changed. Nevertheless, several factors can work against the expectation of large-scale return to Syria as a safe country of origin.
To begin with, Syria remains unsafe despite the fall of the Syrian government. The September 2024 report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria warned of intensifying war “amid continuing patterns of war crimes and fear of large-scale regional conflict.” While the Commission is yet to release its country report post-Assad’s fall, the pockets of fighting in the northeast, at the coastal area, and the Israeli occupation of Syrian territory in the south represent the most recent examples of violence, extending the journey ahead of re-designating Syria as a safe country. In parallel to unsettled security, human security conditions in Syria are equally fragile, and the essential services and infrastructure are dreadfully inadequate for Syrians who remained in the country, let alone for the ones expected to return in large numbers. Economically speaking, the protracted war in Syria left 90 percent of the population in poverty. Housing wise, a quarter of the housing stock is partially damaged. In the health sector, 43 percent of hospitals are either partially functional or non-functional. Lastly, in the education sector, 2.4 million Syrian children are out of school, primarily due to damage to education facilities.
The answer to revitalizing conditions and accommodating the needs of the returnees dramatically hinges on the imposed sanctions on the former Syrian regime since 2011, namely by the US and EU. There are two camps in relation. The first advocates for the unconditional lifting of sanctions since a new government is in power, and delays in lifting sanctions could generate further instability. The second argues for a conditional approach to influence the new government’s behavior to demonstrate a record in line with human rights. In practice, the US and the EU favor a mixed approach: upholding sanctions on specific sectors (e.g., the banking system) and offering relief on others (e.g., energy and transport).
The US and the EU’s approach implies a long journey before Syria’s full recovery and reconstruction. Therefore, it is understandable that Syrians link return to improving living conditions. Syrians in neighboring countries pursue a self-imposed “wait-and-see” strategy, meaning that general political stability, security conditions in areas of origin, and accessibility to essential services top immediate return plans. Additionally, the number of returnees indicates the unwillingness of rushing return. Three months into the collapse of the former Syrian regime, some 301,967 Syrians returned from neighboring countries, where 4.3 million remain registered. Historically, most asylum seekers and refugees never return home, even after the conflict is over. When they do, return occurs erratically; peaking in one to three years after the end of a conflict, and thereafter, the pace of return slows down or sizes to exist.
In light of the above, Turkey’s announcement of “go-and-see” visits was a reasonable response because it allows Syrians to make informed decisions about return while enjoying the right to stay in Turkey. Syrians’ journey in Turkey has not been a smooth one as they have been facing challenges in health and education services, discrimination in the labor market, and racism and hate crimes, with compounded difficulties for the unregistered ones. Leaving Turkey does not mean the scene on other side of the border is brighter, as mentioned earlier. Take Aleppo, for a local example. The city is the hometown of 42 percent of Syrians, or 1.1 million, under temporary protection in Turkey. In Aleppo, six public hospitals and 60 primary health centers operate only partially due to fuel and power shortages. Speaking of power shortages, Syria’s Interim Minister of Electricity said that most areas in the country receive about 2 hours of state power each day and that power will run 24/7 in three years. Hence, Turkey’s “go-and-see” visits policy would be paramount to people considering returning to the city. The “go and see” policy entered into effect in January 2025, allowing one member of each Syrian householder to make three “go-and-see” visits in six months since the policy terminates on July 1, 2025. If, and when, a Syrian individual or a household decides to return,, they submit a voluntary return application to the Presidency of Migration Management in the province of registration. Then, the authorities will verify the applicant(s)’ fingerprints and criminal record and schedule them for an interview. Upon the approval of the voluntary return application, the relevant authority issues a travel permit to the governorate from which one wishes to exit Turkey. Exiting Turkey, on voluntary grounds, terminates the temporary protection Status. To facilitate said visits and overall return, the Turkish Ministry of the Interior announced a plan to increase the processing capacity of border crossings from 3,000 persons a day to 15,000-20,000 persons a day.
A new political reality is settling in Syria, with several difficulties to overcome. The cautious stance of Syrians in neighboring countries—opting for a “wait-and-see” approach—underscores the necessity of well-informed, voluntary and planned return. Turkey’s “go-and-see” visits offer a pragmatic middle ground, allowing Syrians under temporary protection to assess conditions firsthand before making life-altering decisions. Ultimately, any sustainable return solution must be rooted in Syria’s ability to provide genuine safety, economic stability, and basic services to its people—conditions that remain far from reality. Until then, return will remain an option for a limited few rather than a widespread movement.
*Omar Kadkoy is the Foreign Policy, Security, and Migration Program Coordinator at Heinrich Böll Stiftung Istanbul Office.
** The ideas and opinions expressed in GAR Blog publications are those of the authors; they do not reflect those of the Association for Migration Research.
*** The image created by ChatGPT.
