Introduction
The political influence of voters of Turkish origin residing abroad has grown increasingly significant in recent years. As assessed by Kalaycıoğlu (2023) and Levitsky and Way (2020), Turkey has, over the past decade, been classified as a “ sultanist or competitive authoritarian” regime, due to increasing tendencies toward political centralization, erosion of the rule of law, and systematic constraints on opposition parties. This context calls for an examination of political parties’ activity abroad not only within the framework of domestic political dynamics but also in relation to international relations and diplomatic sensitivities. In particular, the electoral preferences of Turkish-origin voters living in societies that uphold democratic norms and respect for human rights, whether in their choice of parties or presidential candidates, or in debates over participation versus abstention in forthcoming Turkish elections, have the potential to shape public opinion and political climate both in their host countries and within Turkey itself.
This paper examines the first overseas rally organized by Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), held in Brussels on 12 October 2025 and described by Chairperson Özgür Özel as an “act of action.” The analysis situates the event within its legal and institutional framework, explores its transnational political dimensions and motivations, and evaluates its organizational processes and implementation strategies involved.
Legal and Institutional Framework
The activities of Turkish political parties abroad, as well as the rights and regulations concerning voters of Turkish origin residing outside Turkey, are defined by the relevant articles of the Basic Provisions of Elections and Electoral Laws, commonly referred to as “Code 298”. For example, Article 94/A explicitly prohibits Turkish political parties from opening election offices abroad, engaging in propaganda, or conducting media campaigns beyond Turkey’s borders (Art. 94/A–E). This regulation was adopted in 2008 by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on the initiative of Justice and Development Party (AKP) deputies. Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek, who was involved in drafting the legislation, explained the rationale behind this provision:
“We have citizens in 155 countries; let’s focus on Germany, where the largest number of our citizens reside. For a long time, Germany did not view our citizens’ voting positively because they did not want the political debates from Turkey to spill over into their own country. Therefore, we included the clause that ‘propaganda cannot be made abroad’” (quoted in Öztürk 2017, and Yilkin 2025).
This statement reveals that the rationale behind the law rests not on normative democratic principles, but rather on foreign policy and diplomatic concerns. Moreover, although the regulation has been in effect since 2008, it lacks clear provisions regarding enforcement mechanisms, monitoring authorities, or consequences for parties violating this ban. The discrepancy between the law’s formal authority and its practical implementation has therefore drawn criticism on grounds of legal coherence and democratic accountability (Yilkin 2025). Notably, during periods of diplomatic tensions, particularly following the 2015 electoral periods and the 2017 referendum campaign, which led Turkey to a transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system, Germany prohibited Turkish political parties or candidates from conducting campaign activities on its territory during the 2018 and 2023 election periods, explicitly, and in away ironically, invoking prohibitive provisions of Turkey’s own Law No. 298. Thus, Turkey’s restrictive domestic legislation has indirectly and paradoxically provided a legitimate basis for other states to limit abroad political activities.
Within this framework, the question arises: how do political parties such as the AKP, CHP, or others organize themselves abroad? Political parties’ overseas representations operate under the association laws of the settlement countries and are prohibited from receiving financial or moral support from foreign parties, associations, or similar entities. Nevertheless, settlement states, while aware of the de facto political functions of these organizations, often display a form of tacit approval, suggesting a delicate balancing act between domestic political considerations and foreign policy interests (Yilkin 2025). As such, although Article 94/A of Law No. 298 is intended to regulate and restrict Turkish political activities abroad, weaknesses in its enforcement and the law’s international repercussions render it a provision that ultimately deepens the tension between legal norms and political practice (Yilkin 2025).
Transnational Politics and Political Motivations
Political rallies organized abroad by Turkish parties are not merely election-period propaganda; rather, they constitute key instruments through which parties project their domestic strategies onto the international stage and establish a reciprocal relationship with the external voters at the same way. The primary objectives of such events are to engage directly with citizens living abroad, strengthen financial resources, and consolidate voter loyalty. However, the political significance of these rallies extends beyond voter mobilization: they also serve as vehicles for shaping foreign policy perceptions, communicating messages to the international public sphere, and reinforcing domestic legitimacy through external recognition.
Within this context, the CHP’s rally in Brussels carries strategic importance against the backdrop of debates on democratic backsliding in Turkey and the stagnation of Turkey–EU relations in recent years. By choosing Brussels, the party not only sought to engage directly with Turkish voters in Europe but also symbolically positioned itself at the heart of the European Union, showing an effort to construct a political identity aligned with democracy, the rule of law, and European values.
The focus of CHP Chairperson Özgür Özel and other speakers on themes such as democratization, freedom of speech, and the rule of law highlights the party’s discursive orientation. On the one hand, this emphasis articulates a principal opposition stance toward the ruling party, which has been criticized for fostering “competitive authoritarianism” in Turkey. On the other hand, it illustrates the CHP’s effort to establish a normative legitimacy in the eyes of European audiences and public opinion. This discourse reflects a broader strategy in which the CHP seeks to position itself as a credible alternative not only within the domestic political arena but also within the international normative order. In this sense, the Brussels rally has functioned as a dual political act: domestically, it aims to reassure the electorate with promises of democracy and reform; internationally, it conveys the message that Turkey can re-engage and align itself to European values. This dual orientation underscores that Turkish political parties increasingly perceive the transnational sphere not merely as a reservoir of electoral potential but also as a platform for generating international legitimacy.
Organizational Process and Implementation
My field observations and the accounts I collected from participants show that the organizational process of the CHP’s Brussels rally provides key insights into the party’s current overseas organizational capacity, level of institutionalization, and strategic coordination skills. While the rally largely followed a planned framework, several logistical, communication, and coordination-related shortcomings have been observed. These issues suggest that the party’s ability to manage complex transnational events has not yet reached full institutional maturity.
Participants traveling to Brussels from neighboring countries such as Germany, France, and Denmark reported deficiencies particularly in transportation and field logistics. For example, delays in transit and long waiting periods on buses, difficulties locating the rally site, and inconsistencies in route coordination highlighted a lack of local knowledge in event management and an operational planning, which had not been sufficiently structured. Moreover, despite being held on a Sunday, the decision to use large bus fleets in congested Brussels limited mobility and negatively affected participant satisfaction. This situation demonstrates that local conditions and urban dynamics were not adequately taken into consideration in the planning process.
By contrast, other parties such as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP /DEM), which have previously organized similar events abroad, often rely on smaller and more flexible vehicles, reflecting a comparatively higher degree of institutionalization in terms of local adaptation and operational experience. In this regard, improving the CHP’s transnational organization would likely require reducing the dependence of decision-making on the central party structure and expanding the initiative space of local branches. In my opinion, that would open the way to a strengthening of mechanisms for transferring the experiences in organizing and participating in abroad rallies into institutional memory to better mobilize active members of local branches, as much as potential voters.
More broadly, the coordination problems observed in areas such as poster distribution, social media communication, and technical infrastructure show that the CHP’s overseas organization has not yet developed its institutional coordination mechanisms. The fragmented nature of intra-party communication limited the scope of digital mobilization and reduced the rally’s intended public visibility, which also contributed to relatively modest participation numbers. For instance, one participant I discussed with explained that he decided to attend only after noticing CHP and Turkish flags along the road. This shows that, although the rally managed to attract some attention through spontaneous and indirect means, the lack of systematic and institutional planning prevented it from evolving into a sustainable and large-scale mobilization effort. Overall, these observations suggest that the CHP’s transnational activities still retain a predominantly network-based and volunteer-driven character. To be consolidated, the organizational capacities of local branches would need stronger strategic guidance and institutional support from the center.
The devoted efforts of local branches and volunteers are decisive in achieving events’ success since this indicates that the party is able to mobilize grassroots energy abroad. For instance, a few months earlier, following the detention and subsequent arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on 19 March 2025, a one-day signature campaign titled “Support for İmamoğlu,” was organized by the CHP in European cities on 23 March 2025. IN Germany, the campaign received 53,537 signatures[1]. This example invites reflection on why the CHP and its local branches have successfully engaged a large segment of external voters of Turkish origin only six months earlier but failed to generate a comparable resonance during the party’s first official rally abroad. The discrepancy suggests possible weaknesses in the rally’s organizational and communication strategies, as well as in its engagement with the target voter base. It also suggests that the CHP has not yet develop transational institutional mechanisms necessary to transform that energy into sustainable organizational capacity.
The CHP’s decision to select Strasbourg (France) for its second overseas rally in the coming months suggests that the party is attempting to enter a more systematic phase of abroad event and rally organization following the Brussels experience. However, reports suggesting that low participation rates may prompt the CHP headquarters to request the resignation of overseas branch leaders point to a potential tension between organizational discipline and volunteer-based participation. This situation clearly highlights the structural contradiction between the long-term requirements of transnational institutionalization and the short-term expectations of political performance.
Conclusion
The CHP’s first official rally in Brussels can be regarded as the party’s initial comprehensive attempt to establish direct contact with voters of Turkish origin living abroad. The event represents a significant milestone both symbolically and strategically. Symbolically, its organization in a city that hosts the core institutions of the European Union reflects the party’s aspiration to strengthen its legitimacy in the international arena. Strategically, the rally sought to mobilize the overseas electorate, enhance the party’s visibility abroad, and ultimately build a more institutionalized organizational presence among this voter group. Nevertheless, several shortcomings were observed in areas such as logistics, transportation planning, and communication coordination. These issues reveal that the CHP’s overseas organizational structure has yet to achieve full institutionalization. However, the partial success of the rally, largely attributable to the efforts of local branches and volunteers, demonstrates that the party possesses significant potential within its overseas voter base. Converting this potential into a sustainable organizational framework will depend on the effective application of systematic planning, institutional learning, and decentralized governance principles.
Within a more institutionalized framework, future overseas activities could strengthen the party’s overall transnational political capacity. However, this process must take into account not only organizational dynamics but also the legal constraints of international law, the political sensitivities of host countries, and the delicate balance of diplomatic relations. Past restrictions imposed by countries such as Germany on President Erdoğan’s rallies illustrate that overseas political activities are deeply intertwined with foreign policy dynamics as much as with domestic political considerations.
In conclusion, the Brussels rally has functioned as an important laboratory for evaluating the CHP’s transnational organizational capacity and political strategy. The findings suggest that, while the party has achieved a certain level of organizational ability abroad, it still requires further strengthening in terms of institutional maturity, local adaptation, and strategic coordination. In this regard, the Brussels experience constitutes not only a meaningful case for the CHP itself but also a valuable point of reference for the broader reassessment of transnational strategies among Turkish political parties.
Short Bibliography
Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2023). Sultanizm ve seçim: Popülizm demokrasiye karşı. Politik Yol. https://www.politikyol.com/sultanizm-ve-secim-populizm-demokrasiye-karsi
Levitsky, S and Lucan A, W. (2020). “The New Competitive Authoritarianism”. Journal of Democracy 31 (1): 51-65.
Öztürk, S. (2017). Getirdiği Yasağı Unutan Ülke. Sözcü Newspaper. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/getirdigi-yasagi-unutan-ulke-wp1729126
Yilkin, A. (2025). To Vote or Not to Vote: (Dis-)Engagement of Grandchildren of “Guest Workers” in Turkish Elections (2014-2023) A Case Study on Political (Non-)Participation of Turkish Youth of Germany,(Unpublish Doctoral Thesis) Bielefeld University.
[1] Author’s note: The number cited in the text was calculated based on social media posts published by the CHP’s Overseas Branch Presidents in Germany.
** The ideas and opinions expressed in GAR Blog publications are those of the authors; they do not reflect those of the Association for Migration Research.
