Ekaterina Krasilova*
This blog post explores the level of integration of Syrians in Turkey after more than a decade of coexistence. It examines the internal ‘harmonization’ of society and the reasons behind the existing stratification in Turkey, with particular emphasis on misunderstandings regarding the status of Syrians. Additionally, it discusses potential reasons for societal resentment and prospects for the integration of Syrians into Turkish society, drawing on specific observations.
Background Overview: How It Started for Syrian Refugees
More than 10 years have passed since Turkey first accepted refugees from Syria under the “open door policy”. The arrival of millions of Syrians in Turkey following the outbreak of the Syrian war was mainly facilitated by the free trade and visa-free agreements between Turkey and Syria, established prior to 2011. The initial statements by Turkish authorities under the open-door policy, referring to the provision of humanitarian aid to 100,000 Syrians as support for ‘religious brothers and sisters,’ ‘friends,’ and ‘victims,’ culminated in an unforeseen influx of 3.7 million refugees at its peak in 2021, according to UNHCR—a challenge for which neither the economy nor the population was adequately prepared.
While adhering to the 1951 Convention on the Rights of Refugees and upholding the principle of non-refoulement, Turkey grants refugee status exclusively to individuals fleeing from Council of Europe member states. That is why Syrians, recognized as refugees by the international community, are granted only temporary protection status in Turkey. This status, on one hand, protects their social and economic rights and provides an official basis for staying in the country, but on the other hand, restricts their right to free movement beyond their registered city and does not facilitate obtaining Turkish citizenship over time.
The term ‘integration,’ which carries a negative connotation for Turkish authorities, is not officially used in Turkey regarding Syrians. Instead, it has been replaced with the concept of ‘harmonization’ (uyum) within society, the level of which will be analyzed further.
Challenges for the harmonization
The mass reception of Syrians coincided with a period of rising unemployment, estimated at 9.2% in 2024 (TurkStat, 2024), a depreciating Turkish lira, and a worsening economic situation. The increasing tendency of employers to hire Syrians—often illegally and at minimum wage—led many Turkish people, especially the youth, to voice concerns about the difficulty of securing jobs with salaries above the minimum wage. However, it was thanks to refugees that jobs involving physical and manual labor, such as the ones in factories, fields, and agriculture, which were not in demand among Turkish citizens, were filled, allowing the Turkish economy to sustain growth.
To “harmonize” society, the Turkish government has provided free healthcare, free primary and secondary education for Syrian children, the right to work permits since 2016, and the opportunity to attend universities and receive scholarships after passing the international university entrance exam (TR-YÖS). However, for adults, Turkish language courses have been mainly provided by non-governmental organizations. Additionally, many Syrians, for their part, may not know Turkish well and continue to communicate with each other in Arabic, especially in the southeastern regions of Turkey—such as Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, and Mardin—where Syrians constitute more than 15% of the total population (Erdoğan, 2022).
It appears that Turkish people generally do not express the same negative sentiments toward Russians and Ukrainians, who arrived in Turkey swiftly following the events of 2022. However, it is worth noting that the number of Ukrainians and Russians is not comparable to the number of registered Syrians, which has reached 3.7 million. According to UNHCR data for 2022, there were 145,000 Ukrainian refugees in Turkey, while in 2024, there were 20,877 Ukrainians and 43,649 Russians with short-term residence permits (Presidency of Migration Management of Turkey, 2024).
Level of integration of the Syrian refugees
The noticeable increase in anti-immigrant sentiment in society could be attributed to the ongoing economic crisis, during which “immigrants were perceived as scapegoats and competitors for the native population in the labour market” and their participation was seen as an additional burden on the welfare state (Balta et al., 2023). Following the earthquake in southeastern Turkey in February 2023 and the subsequent displacement of people from these regions, including Syrian refugees, social tensions became even more apparent, possibly due to resource shortages, widespread panic, and limited government action (Sert et al., 2023).
Overall, the government has been slow in integrating Syrians in Turkey and “harmonizing” society, leading to the stratification of society. Without more effective integration measures, this may result in increased social tensions in Turkey. After more than a decade of living in the country, Syrians have become not just “guests” but an integral part of Turkey—a reality that many Turkish people may be unwilling to fully accept.
An unclear future for the Syrians
Since December 2024, a new reality has emerged in Syria following the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. There is renewed enthusiasm among Syrians; however, despite the change of power, the country’s future remains uncertain, as different groups continue to control various regions. The internal divisions within Syrian society and ongoing instability pose a threat to a wide range of regional players. As a neighbouring country and a key regional actor, Turkey will likely play a significant role in addressing the Syrian crisis. Therefore, Turkish migration policy must be prepared for various scenarios. Another large wave of refugees from the conflict zone remains a possibility, as Syria continues to face chaos and uncertainty, with multiple potential outcomes. After more than a decade of war, the country remains in a fragile state, and its prospects for recovery are still unclear.
With the fall of the Assad regime in Turkey, it might be possible for Syrians to return to their homeland in near future. Nevertheless, some Syrians will likely remain in Turkey particularly those who are already built their lives here, secured stable jobs and have children studying in Turkish schools. Taking into consideration that Turkey has already became “home” for some Syrians (Arslan et al., 2020), more effective integration strategies should be implemented. On the other hand, perhaps these events will allow almost 3 million Syrians in Turkey under temporary protection status to return to their hometowns soon and start their lives from scratch.
*Ekaterina Krasilova is a graduate student at the University of Turin UNITO in Italy with the specialization in international development and international relations. She has undergone the Erasmus exchange programme and the research internship in the Bilgi University, Istanbul under the supervision of the Professor Gülay Uğur Göksel. Ekaterina’s studies are focused on the migration crisis and the role of Turkey in it. In this blog post, she attempted to analyze the Syrian integration process in Turkey and the level of harmonization of the society after living together more than a decade.
** The ideas and opinions expressed in GAR Blog publications are those of the authors; they do not reflect those of the Association for Migration Research.
*** The image created by ChatGPT
References
Arslan A., Yıldırım S., Dinler M. (2020). Social, Cultural and Economic Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Middle East journal of refugee studies.
Balta E., Elçi E., Sert D. (2023), Seçimler ve Türkiye’deki göç tartişmalari, Heinrich Boll Stiftung.
Erdoğan, M. (2022). Syrians barometer – 2022: a framework for achieving social cohesion with Syrians in Turkey. SerBest Kitaplar, p. 30).
Sert, D., Danış, D., Sevinin, E. (2023). Göç ve Deprem Durum Tespit Raporu. Istanbul: Göç Araştırmaları Derneği.
UNHCR (2022), annual fact sheet Turkey
(2024, December 5). Residence permits. Presidency of the migration management of Turkey. residence permits
(2024, August 12). Labour Force Statistics. Turkstat turkstat corporate
